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ABSTRACT

In December 2007, the WTO awarded Antigua the right to
suspend TRIPS obligations at a value of $21 million. This
decision represents the WTO's continuing evolution into a body
capable of addressing the concerns of developed countries while
balancing the legitimate interests of developed nations. For the
second time, the WTO has authorized suspension of intellectual
property protection under the TRIPS agreement. Such a
remedy, if widely adopted, has the capacity to address concerns
surrounding effective retaliation by small economies versus
large economies, which traditionally have discouraged
developing countries from participating in WTO dispute
resolution. Additionally, the remedy seems likely to increase
compliance because it constitutes a significant threat to
developed nations. Because the recent decision seems to increase
both participation and compliance in the dispute resolution
system, this Note argues that the decision represents an
important and effective step in WTO jurisprudence.
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I. INTRODUCTION AND STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

On December 27, 2007, a special arbitration panel of the World
Trade Organization (WTO) announced its decision regarding the
amount of damages that the United States owed to Antigua-Barbuda
(Antigua) as a result of the U.S.'s failure to comply with a previous
Appellate Body decision that ordered the U.S. to cease its disparate
treatment of offshore gambling providers. 1 The Arbitrator also

1.
Decision by the Arbitrator, United States-Measures Affecting the CrossBorder Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, Recourse to Arbitration by the United
States Under Article 22.6 of the DSU,
6.1, WT/DS285/ARB (Dec. 21, 2007)
[hereinafter 22.6 Panel Report]. This Note will refer broadly to the dispute between
Antigua and the United States as "Antigua-Gambling."
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decided the question of remedy 2 and, consequently, addressed the
question of meaningful retaliation by a developing country against a
fully developed economy. 3 Although the burgeoning problem of
effective retaliation is far from unique to Antigua, 4 the AntiguaGambling case presented to the world a uniquely dramatic tableau- 5
impact
a country of minute resources and insignificant economic
6
hegemon.
economic
foremost
world's
seeking to punish the
Certainly, Antigua has amplified the drama of the situation,
characterizing itself as the "David" pitted against the U.S. as
"Goliath," and encouraging the world to see it as a tiny force of justice
and righteousness whose struggle against the bloated behemoth
ought to be rewarded with victory. 7 Of course, the U.S. has offered its
own characterization of events, presenting the struggle as one of
national morality holding firm against international crime. 8 Both
sides, perhaps as a result of these competing moral narratives, made
outrageous demands of the WTO Arbitrators: 9 Antigua demanded

2.

Id.
2.3-.5.
4.39 (considering Antigua's contention that suspending
See id.
3.
concessions in the same sectors of trade or under the same treaty as the violation
would be neither "practical" nor "effective"). The term "developing country" is a term of
art within the WTO itself. See PETER-TOBIAS STOLL & FRANK SCHORKOPF, WTO:
WORLD ECONOMIC ORDER, WORLD TRADE LAw 22-23 (2006).
[T]he WTO ... distinguishes between the group of Developing Countries ...
and a specially defined sub-group, the Least-Developed countries . . . . In the

absence of an explicit definition of the group of developing countries in the
WTO Agreements, the categorization is made on the basis of a declaration by
the respective State, which can, however, be contested by other Members.
Id.
4.
For example, the EC-Bananas case involved, in one stage of its proceedings,
a similar question of retaliation by Ecuador against the European Communities.
Decision by the Arbitrators, European Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sale
and Distribution of Bananas-Recourse to Arbitration by the European Communities
Under Article 22.6 of the DSU, WT/DS27/ARB (Apr. 9, 1999) [hereinafter EC-Bananas III
Panel Report].
See James D. Thayer, The Trade of Cross-Border Gambling and Betting:
5.
The WTO Dispute Between Antigua and the United States, 2004 DUKE L. & TECH. REV.
13, 14 (2004) (discussing the significance of gambling to Antigua's economy).
22.6 Panel Report, supra note 1, 4.2.
6.
7.
Press Release, U.S. Mission to the UN in Geneva, Statements by United
States at WTO Dispute Settlement Body Meeting (July 24, 2007), available at
http://www.usmission.ch/Press2007/0724DSB.html ('There can be no question of
responding to a finding of an unintentional commitment on gambling in a way which
would undermine the important public policy of preserving public morals. The United
States does not believe any other responsible WTO Member would act any differently
towards its own citizens.").
Id.
8.
See 22.6 Panel Report, supra note 1, 3.137 (noting that the approaches by
9.
the parties are "all or nothing").
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more than $3 billion, 10 while the U.S. would only concede that its
laws had affected Antigua's economy to the tune of $500,000.11
Despite the two countries' dramatic portrayals of the conflict, the
issues presented by the case are vitally important.
Developing
countries are in a state of flux as they attempt to break into a trading
system that, if not intentionally designed to exclude them, has only
recently begun to make certain concessions and allowances to help
promote their advancement. 12 Currently, countries like Antigua,
upon winning victories from the WTO arbitrators, face the problem of
enforcement.
For such countries, Antigua's travails signal the
trading system's readiness to consider the significant challenges faced
by developing countries that attempt to enforce judgments against
developed economies. 13 On the other hand, more developed countries
have reason to be concerned about asymmetrical remedies. 14 The
situation epitomizes the complexity of the WTO's task: balancing the
desires of national economies and the best interests of the global
15
economy.

10.

Id.

2.3.

11.
Id. 3.148.
12.
For a discussion on the calculations of developing countries evaluating
whether to participate in the WTO, see, e.g., Will Martin & L. Alan Winters, The

Uruguay Round: A Milestone for the Developing Countries, in THE URUGUAY ROUND
(Will Martin & L. Alan Winters eds., 1996)

AND THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 1, 1

(discussing the significant benefits available to developing countries as a result of
participation in the WTO, as well as the general benefits of global trade).
13.
See Chad P. Bown & Bernard M. Hoekman, WTO Dispute Settlement and
the Missing Developing Country Cases: Engaging the Private Sector, 8 J. INT'L ECON. L.
861, 863 (2005) (discussing the various factors which have discouraged developing
countries from bringing suit in the WTO against more powerful trading partners).
14.
See infra Part IV for a detailed discussion of the effect of the particular
TRIPS suspension asymmetrical remedy.
15.

The WTO possesses what no other international regime has been able
to achieve, and what no regional trade agreement can apparently
duplicate with success: a set of largely universal ground rules ... with
a central judicial authority that can interpret these rules in a
consistent and impartial manner over time. . . . The ability of the
Appellate Body to resolve conflicts in sensitive areas (such as . . . the
special and differential treatment of developing countries) has been
viewed by some as . . . activism . . . . But what may be labelled as

"activism" could be more aptly called "effectiveness." While the balance
between political and judicial institutions in the WTO has been
debated and questioned, a genius of the existing system was the
creation of judicial institutions that could be effective even where
political change was difficult.
Robert Howse & Susan Esserman, The Appellate Body, the WTO Dispute Settlement
System, and the Politics of Multilateralism, in THE WTO AT TEN: THE CONTRIBUTION
OF THE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM 61, 61-62 (Giorgio Sacerdoti et al. eds., 2006).
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Like the proverbial "mills of God" which "grind slowly,
yet ...exceedingly small," 16 the WTO, by its very nature, opposes
affecting large-scale change through its decisions. 17 As a result of
this decision making approach, the Antigua-Gambling decision has
already created dissatisfaction and seems likely to create more from
those who seek a definitive answer to the questions raised by the
8
dispute.'
The decision is not a decisive win for developing countries; the
amount authorized, at $21 million, is a mere fraction of the amount
requested' 9 and, by some calculations, a fraction of the amount that
Antigua deserves. 20 Yet, this Note argues that the decision should be
viewed as a significant step towards the availability of fair retaliation
by developing countries and a significant step away from the view of
21
the WTO as a "kangaroo court" for powerful developed countries.
For Antigua and similarly situated countries, suspension of
obligations under the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights (TRIPS) should represent a remedy which carries heft and
meaning.
While no sudden change ought to be expected, the decision
represents a significant step toward full evolution of a remedy
developing countries can use to gain leverage sufficient to force
developed economies to honor commitments. Antigua-Gambling adds
significantly to a remedy previously authorized in only one case (and
never implemented)-TRIPS suspension. 22 Suspension of obligations
under TRIPS offers a potential solution to the main problems facing

16.

Henry

Wadsworth

Longfellow,

Retribution, in HENRY

WADSWORTH

LONGFELLOW, POEMS 394 (1850).

17.

See David Evans & Celso de Tarso Pereira, DSU Review: A View from the

Inside, in KEY ISSUES IN WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT: THE FIRST TEN YEARS 251, 265-

66 (Rufus Yerxa & Bruce Wilson eds., 2005) (indicating that because international law
has no external means of ensuring compliance, changes wrought via its mechanisms
are perceived as excessively slow).
18.
See, e.g., Luis Carlos Nino, WTO Rules in Favour of Antigua & Barbuda in
Online Gambling Dispute, GLOBAL INSIGHT, Dec. 27, 2007 (claiming that the WTO
decision treats U.S. non-compliance too lightly). But see Phyllis Schlafly, World Thade
OrganizationIs No Friend to U.S., COPLEY NEWS, Jan. 2, 2008 (claiming that the WTO
decision intrudes upon U.S. internal legal affairs).
19.
22.6 Panel Report, supra note 1, 2.2 (indicating that Antigua demanded
$3.443 billion dollars).
20.
Id.
3.62-.73 (detailing the separate opinion of one of the 22.3
arbitrators, who takes issue with the interpretation of the Appellate Body's conclusions
and would interpret those conclusions to mean that the calculations of Antigua's
damages should include all the US gambling provisions, rather than the Interstate
Horseracing Act only).
21.
See Evans & de Tarso Pereira, supra note 17, at 264 (noting the murkiness
of the early years of the GATT and the perception that it only existed to serve the
interests of developed countries).
4.117-.119 (finding that Antigua is
22.
22.6 Panel Report, supra note 1,
entitled to suspend obligations under the TRIPS Agreement).
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developing countries that attempt to retaliate against developed
economies. It constitutes a grave threat to developed economies while
23
imposing minimal unpleasant effects on the inflicting country,
effectively exerting pressure on developed economies to either honor
24
obligations or pay fair settlement prices.
This Note recognizes the WTO decision as an important step
towards the authorization of a practical remedy for developing
nations against violations by developed countries.
Part II
summarizes the proceedings between Antigua and the U.S. prior to
the December 27, 2007 arbitration report. Part III details the specific
ways in which the 22.6 Arbitrator's decision extended the TRIPS
suspension remedy as an option for developing nations and includes a
discussion of the reasons for broadening access of to remedies for
developing nations. Part IV focuses on the implications of the TRIPS
suspension remedy itself, tackling the arguments against using
intellectual property rights as a means of retaliation and affirming
the potential efficacy of this kind of asymmetrical remedy in the
context of drastically imbalanced economies.

II.

HISTORY OF THE ANTIGUA-U.S. DISPUTE

A. Brief Overview of the History of the Dispute
Antigua brought a complaint against the U.S. before the WTO in
2003,25 alleging that the laws recently passed by the U.S., which
restricted credit card company involvement in payments related to
Internet gambling, 26 violated U.S. services commitments under the
General Agreement in Trade and Services (GATS) Article XV.27 The
U.S. law had significant implications for Antigua's developing
economy. Antigua is a tiny nation whose economy depends largely on
Internet gambling, 28 and U.S. citizens constitute a significant

23.
See infra Part IV.A.
24.
See infra Part IV.B.
25.
Thayer, supra note 5, at 13.
26.
Request for Consultations by Antigua and Barbuda, United StatesMeasures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, intro.,
WT/DS285/1 (Mar. 27, 2003) [hereinafter Antigua Request for Consultations].
27.
Id.; see also id. annex I-II (listing the specific federal and state laws alleged
to affect cross-border gambling).
28.

In the past ten years, Antigua attempted to diversify its economy yet
again, and developed an infrastructure that supported gambling and
betting services, operating primarily over the Internet. By 1997, there
were over twenty Internet gambling and betting businesses operating
in Antigua. By 1999, following a government-licensing program,
employment in Antigua's gambling and betting industry reached 3,000.
At this time, there were 119 licensed Internet gambling and betting
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percentage of those gamblers. 29 The U.S. passed a series of laws 30
that, according to Antigua, "made the supply of cross-border gambling
and betting services from Antigua to the U.S. 'illegal in all instances
under [U.S.] Law.' 31 The new laws were allegedly discriminatory in
their impact on Antigua's economy because "the proposed U.S. ban on
the use of credit cards and other financial instruments for Internet
gambling effectively bans the supply of any offshore gambling and
betting services to the [U.S.]," while gambling institutions located
within the U.S. remained unaffected. 3 2 Thus, Antigua took the
position that the law was "an internal regulation that acts primarily
as an external trade barrier, closing off the U.S. gambling and betting
'33
services market from foreign providers.
34
The WTO Dispute Resolution Panel ruled in favor of Antigua.
In its argument, the U.S. had attempted to justify the laws that
explicitly addressed Internet gambling as necessary to protect public
morals, indicating that the laws fell within the GATS Article XIV
exemptions. 35 The Panel rejected this finding, primarily because it
found that the U.S. had failed to negotiate with Antigua to find a
neutral solution that balanced national interests with trade
obligations. 3 6 The Panel also found that other U.S. legislation
regulating Internet horse betting was applied in a discriminatory
way, by arbitrarily
distinguishing between domestic
and
37
international gambling organizations.

operations in Antigua. Also by 1999, the Antiguan government was
receiving over $ 7.4 million dollars annually in licensing fees,
accounting for over ten percent of the nation's gross domestic product.
Thayer, supranote 5, at 14.
29.
See Lorraine Woellert, A Web Gambling Fight Could Harm Free Trade,
BUSINESS WEEK, Aug. 13, 2007, at 43 (stating that Antigua and other developed
countries seeking "big amends" for harm to web-gambling operations).
30.
Although Antigua's complaint cited a long list of offending laws, the
Dispute Resolution Panel focused on the three most important regulations of internet
gambling: the Federal Wire Wager Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1081-1084 (2008) [hereinafter
Wire Act], the Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (2008), and the Illegal Gambling Business
Act of 1970, 18 U.S.C. § 1955 (2008) [hereinafter Illegal Gambling Business Act]. Panel
Report, United States-Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and
Betting Services,
3.72, 3.93, 3.286, 6.543, WT/DS285/R (Nov. 10, 2004) [hereinafter
Gambling Panel Report].
31.
Thayer, supra note 5, at 14.
32.
Caroline Bissett, All Bets Are Off(Line): Antigua's Trouble in Virtual
Paradise,35 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 367, 369 (2004).
33.
Id.
34.
Gambling Panel Report, supra note 30, 6.134.
35.
Kelly Ann Tran, The WTO Appellate Body Gambles on the Future of the
GATS: Analyzing the Internet Gambling Dispute Between Antigua and the United
States Before the World Trade Organization,6 APPALACHIAN J.L. 165, 175-76 (2006).
36.
See Gambling Panel Report, supra note 30,
6.563-.565.
37.
Id. 6.608.
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The Appellate Body reversed a significant number of the findings
of the Panel. 38
The Appellate Body rejected the concept of
"theoretical better alternatives" for trade found through negotiation,
and thus accepted the U.S. argument that public morals justified the
series of laws that directly regulated Internet gambling. 39 However,
the Appellate Body upheld the decision of the Panel as to Internet
horse betting, and recommended that the U.S. change their laws
40
accordingly.
The U.S. did not change its laws or take any action to comply
with the Panel's findings. 4 1 It justified this inaction as "compliance"
before a compliance panel convened per Article 21.5, alleging that the
42
original laws were fully consistent with its obligations under GATS.
The 21.5 Panel rejected this argument as an inappropriate attempt to
reassert contentions previously rejected by the Appellate Body 4 3 and
determined that the U.S. had failed to comply with the Appellate
Body's recommendation. 44
Antigua requested arbitration under
GATS Article 22.6 in order to determine how much the U.S. owed in
concessions and the form those concessions would take. 45 The 22.6
arbitration led to the December 27, 2007 decision to authorize $21
46
million in retaliation.

38.
Appellate Body Report, United States-MeasuresAffecting the Cross-Border
Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, WT/DS285/AB/R,
373 (Apr. 7, 2005)
[hereinafter AB Report].
39.
Id. 77 317, 321.
40.
Id. I 373(D)(v)-(vi).
41.
See Article 21.5 Panel Report, United States-MeasuresAffecting the CrossBorder Supply of Gambling and Betting Services: Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by
Antigua and Barbuda, 6.8, WT/DS285/RW (Mar. 30, 2007) [hereinafter 21.5 Panel
Report] ("The parties do not dispute that the United States has not taken any new
measures.").
42.

The United States submits that the "measures taken to comply" in this
dispute are the same measures that were at issue in the original
proceeding because those measures are consistent with its WTO
obligations .... The United States submits that it has complied with

the DSB recommendations and rulings by presenting new evidence and
arguments during this compliance proceeding that do meet the burden
of showing that the measures at issue satisfy the criteria of the
chapeau of Article XIV of the GATS.
Id.

6.4.
43.
Id. 6.57.
44.
Id. T 7.1 ("Mhe Panel concludes that, the United States has failed to
comply with the recommendations and rulings of the DSB in this dispute.").
45.
22.6 Panel Report, supra note 1, 2.2.
46.
Id. 76.1.
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B. DetailedAnalysis of the InitialArguments and Rationale
of the WTO Priorto the 22.6 Arbitration
1.

Key Arguments by Both Countries Before the Dispute Resolution
Panel

Antigua alleged that the U.S. violated its services commitments
under GATS Article XIV 47 by restricting credit card company
involvement in payments to Internet gambling. 48
Antigua's
complaint acknowledged that the U.S. commitments to the WTO did
not explicitly mention gambling" s but argued that such an obligation
was implied by a commitment that covered "other recreational
services (except sporting)." 50 Antigua claimed that the "definition of
'other recreational services (except sporting)' is found in a United
Nations' document the U.S. used as a template for its commitments,
the Central Product Classification," 5 1 and thus extrapolated a
commitment which would cover cross-border gambling.
In response, the U.S. argued that Antigua failed to assert a
specific correlation between Antigua's offshore gambling institutions
and U.S. domestic gambling. 52
In addition to this procedural
argument, the U.S. maintained that GATS Article XIV(a) permitted

47.
Antigua Request for Consultations, supra note 26, intro.
48.
Gambling Panel Report, supra note 30,
3.72, 3.93, 3.286, 6.543.
49.
Thayer, supra note 5, at 18.
50.
Id.; see also General Agreement on Trade in Services, art. XIV, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1B,
Legal Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1167 (1994) [hereinafter
GATS].
51.
Thayer, supra note 5, at 18.
52.

[T]he United States argued that Antigua failed to meet ... procedural
burdens of proof. First, that Antigua failed to make a prima facie case
that "any specific U.S. measure is inconsistent with WTO obligations."
The United States argued that Antigua did not provide any analysis of
specific United States laws as they relate to gambling, but it rather
asked the Panel to accept its assertion that a list of relevant United
States laws represent a "total prohibition" on cross-border
gambling ....
The United States alternatively argued that even if
Antigua had met its burden of proof, the United States had not
violated its obligations under the GATS. According to the United
States, Antigua failed to show that the United States adopted any
measures specifically prohibited by either the market access or
national treatment doctrines of the GATS .... In addition, the United

States argued that, as required for national treatment obligations to
apply, Antigua failed to show that its remote gambling services and
suppliers are 'like" the non-remote gambling services and suppliers of
the United States.
Id. at 19-20 (internal citations omitted).
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the regulation of gambling in countries where it was considered a
53
moral evil.
The Panel decided in favor of Antigua 54 because the U.S. "had
failed to demonstrate that the federal laws at issue qualify for a
GATS Article XIV exception." 55 The Panel applied the analysis
56
previously used in an importation dispute to support its conclusion.
57
The three Korea Beef elements that were used are:
(a) the measure for which justification is claimed
compliance" with other laws or regulations;

must

"secure

(b) those other "laws or regulations" must not be inconsistent with the
WTO Agreement; and
(c) the measure for which justification is claimed must be "necessary" to
58
secure compliance with those other laws or regulations.

The Panel decided that the first element was met 59 because the U.S.
could convincingly argue that its interests under the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organization (RICO) statute 60 were affected
by offshore gambling. 61 The Panel determined, however, that the
second element was not met 62 because, although RICO protects
important government interests, it is nevertheless inconsistent with
WTO trade obligations.6 3 Further, the U.S. could not prove that
RICO was the most necessary measure to secure compliance with its
other laws and regulations, because it did not seek negotiations with
64
Antigua in order to implement a less restrictive set of laws.
The Panel's most important determination, which the Appellate
Body upheld in part,6 5 was that the U.S. had violated the

53.
Tran, supra note 35, at 175-76 ("The U.S. justified its restrictions on
Internet gambling as an exception from the U.S. GATS commitments based on Article
XIV(a), which states that the GATS agreement shall not prevent governments from
adopting or enforcing measures deemed 'necessary' to protect public morals or
maintain public order.").
54.
See Gambling Panel Report, supra note 30, 6.134.
55.
Albena P. Petrova, The WTO Internet Gambling Dispute as a Case of First
Impression: How to Interpret Exceptions Under GATS Article XlV(a) and How to Set the
Trend for Implementation and Compliance in WTO Cases Involving "Public Morals"
and "PublicOrder"Concerns?,6 RICH. J. GLOBAL L. & BUS. 45, 49 (2006).
Appellate Body Report, Korea-Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh,
56.
Chilled and Frozen Beef, WT/DS169/AB/R (Dec. 11, 2000) [hereinafter Korea Beef].
Gambling Panel Report, supra note 30, 7 6.536-537.
57.
Id. 7 6.536.
58.
Id. 6.564.
59.
60.
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 19611968 (2008).
61.
Petrova, supra note 55, at 55.
62.
Gambling Panel Report, supranote 30, 6.564.
63.
Petrova, supra note 55, at 55.
64.
Id.
65.

[T]he AB concluded that the U.S. demonstrated that the Wire Act, the
Travel Act, and the IGBA are necessary to protect public morals or
maintain public order, but that it has not shown, that the prohibitions
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introductory section of Article XIV, referred to as "the chapeau. '66
"The chapeau requires that the measures in question are not applied
in a manner that would constitute arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination between countries where like conditions prevail, or a
disguised restriction on trade in services. ' 67 The Panel found that the
U.S. had twice applied its laws in a discriminatory manner. 68 The
primary finding of discrimination related to the Interstate
69
Horseracing Act (IHA):
[T]he IHA permits the remote supply of gambling and betting services
for horse races and that the federal laws that prohibit the use of remote
communication to supply gambling and betting services do not apply to
horse race-betting because the IHA effectively exempts such betting
from the application of the relevant federal laws. The text of the IHA
does appear, on its face, to permit interstate pari-mutuel wagering over
the telephone or via other modes of electronic communication, which
presumably would include the Internet, as long as such wagering is
legal in both states. Thus, [the] IHA authorizes domestic service
suppliers but not foreign service suppliers to offer remote betting
services to horse races, and as such constitutes "arbitrary and
unjustifiable discrimination between countries where like conditions
70
prevail" and/or a "disguised restriction on trade."
71
The Appellate Body would uphold this finding.

2.

Appellate Body Findings

The Appellate Body reversed significant portions of the Panel's
decision. 72 The Appellate Body accepted the analysis from the Korea

in IHA apply to both foreign and domestic service suppliers of remote
betting services for horse racing and, therefore, IHA fails to satisfy the
requirements of the chapeau.
Id. at 63-64.
66.
GATS, supra note 50, art. XIV.
67.
Petrova, supra note 55, at 55.
68.

The Panel held that the United States did not consistently apply its
prohibition to the remote supply of gambling services domestically and
from other WTO Members. The Panel noted that the United States
had failed to make a showing that its enforcement actions against
large-scale Internet operators in the United States that provide remote
supply of gambling and betting services, such as TVG, Capital OTB
and Xpressbet.com, are consistent with the requirements of the
chapeau.

Id. at 58.
69.
See Tran, supra note 35, at 188 ("In effect, the IHA allows betting on horse
races by phone or computer, but that right is limited only to U.S. states where it is
legal to place and accept bets, therefore demonstrating outright discrimination against
foreign companies.").
70.
Petrova, supra note 55, at 56.
71.
Id. at 61.
72.
AB Report, supra note 38, 373.
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Beef case 73 but modified the application of the second and third
elements of the test:
[Tihe results of the comparison should be considered in view of the
interests at issue. Thus ...the Panel should have decided whether the
measure is necessary by first weighing and balancing, then comparing
the measures, and finally considering the interests at issue .... [T]he
Panel should have determined whether a measure is necessary or
another WTO-consistent measure is reasonably available. . . . [A]n
alternative measure is not reasonably available when it is solely
74
theoretical in nature.

The Appellate Body overruled the Panel's finding that consultations
with Antigua were a necessary precondition to satisfying the
"necessary to secure compliance" prong of the Korean Beef analysis. 75
The lack of real, as opposed to theoretical, alternative ways of
securing U.S. interests7 6 supported the U.S. argument that its
restrictions fell within the morals exception. 77 "[B]ecause the [U.S.]
made its prima facie case of necessity, and Antigua failed to identify a
reasonably available alternative measure, the Appellate Body
concluded that the [U.S.] demonstrated that its three federal statutes
are necessary to protect public morals and to maintain public
78
order."
However, as noted above, the Appellate Body decided that the
U.S. had not satisfactorily shown "that the prohibitions in [the] IHA
apply to both foreign and domestic service suppliers of remote betting
services for horse racing and, therefore, [the] IHA fails to satisfy the
''79
requirements of the chapeau.
3.

Compliance Issues: 21.5 Compliance Panel and 22.6 Arbitration

Following the decision of the Appellate Body, the U.S. announced
that it was withdrawing from its commitment to provide offshore
gambling,8 0 and, as a result, continued to negotiate the scope of
possible concessions with the affected WTO members.8 1 Although
news releases suggested that the U.S. would consider itself in

73.
Id.
305-06.
74.
Petrova, supra note 55, at 59.
75.
AB Report, supra note 38,
317, 321.
76.
See Tran, supra note 35, at 181-82 (discussing the ways in which the
Appellate Body decision ignored previous decisions and modes of analysis; primarily,
the Appellate Body shifted the burden of proof away from the United States to justify
its measure as the least restrictive).
77.
AB Report, supra note 38, I 326-27.
78.
Petrova, supra note 55, at 60.
79.
Id. at 61-62; accord AB Report, supra note 38, 373(D)(vi).
80.
Bruce Zagaris, European Trade Association Brings Complaint Before EU
over Selective U.S. Prosecutionof Internet Gaming, CYBERCRIME, Feb. 2008.

81.

Id.
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compliance after the withdrawal was affected,8 2 the U.S. did not raise
any arguments related to this announcement in the arbitration
83
related to compliance issues.
Although the Award of the Arbitrator, under Article 21.3, gave
the U.S. until April 2006 to conform its laws and regulations to its
GATS obligations,8 4 the U.S. took no action.8 5 Antigua subsequently
took steps to establish non-compliance by requesting establishment of
a Compliance Panel under Article 21.5.86
The Panel scornfully dismissed the U.S. argument as simply an
attempt to reassert its original argument.8 7 According to the Panel,
the U.S. claimed that its inaction constituted "conformity"8 8 on the
grounds that its laws had been in compliance from the beginning of
the dispute. Thus, the U.S. sought to challenge the Appellate Body
findings and demonstrate to the Panel its laws conformed to its GATS
obligations all along.89 The Panel rejected this argument, declaring
that a demonstrable change in the laws-either a change originating
in the U.S. or a change in the legal situation-was necessary to
support a finding of compliance. 90 The U.S. was, in effect, attempting
to re-argue the same issues,91 which conflicted with its commitment
92
to "unconditionally accept" the findings of the Appellate Body.
Thus, the Panel found that the U.S. had not complied within the
93
requisite timeframe.
Following this finding, Antigua requested authorization to
suspend certain GATS privileges and TRIPS concessions. 94 The
subsequent arbitration, convened pursuant to Article 22.6, sought to
determine the propriety of the remedy requested and the proper
The Arbitrator's decision devoted
amount for suspension. 95

Id.
82.
83.
See generally 21.5 Panel Report, supra note 41; 22.6 Panel Report, supra
note 1.
84.
22.6 Panel Report, supra note 1, 1.3.
85.
21.5 Panel Report, supra note 41, 6.4.
86.
22.6 Panel Report, supra note 1, 1.4.
87.
See 21.5 Panel Report, supra note 41, 6.28 ("The novel element on which
the United States seeks to rely to demonstrate its compliance are its submissions to
this compliance Panel.").
88.
Id.
Id. 6.4.
89.
90.
See id.
6.12-14 (defining the terms "conformity" and "inconsistent" in
order to conclude that "these two terms, in context, indicate that, in order to bring a
measure ...

into 'conformity with'. . . some change must come about").

91.
Id.
6.55-57.
92.
See id.
6.57 ("The United States' position can be characterized as an
acceptance of the original ruling on condition that it retains the right to seek a more
favorable conclusion in a future proceeding. That type of acceptance is not
unconditional.").
93.
Id. 7.1.
1.5-6.
94.
22.6 Panel Report, supra note 1,
95.
Id. 2.2.
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considerable attention to the development of an appropriate
counterfactual that would determine the degree to which Antigua's
economy had been affected by the U.S. action. 96 However, as Antigua
had abandoned its arguments regarding the proper remedy under
addressed only the legality of the requested
GATS, 9 7 the decision
98
TRIPS suspensions.
4.

Broad Context of the 22.6 Arbitration

Both Antigua and the U.S. claimed the resolution of the
arbitration as a victory. 99 In reality, the decision reached a midpoint
between the respective countries' positions, establishing a victory for
the evolution of the international trading system itself.
Voluntary compliance with WTO rules and procedures is of the
utmost importance to the international trading system.' 0 0 Given the
increasingly globalized market, the coming years will see an increase
in the importance of the WTO as a cohesive force and arbiter of
disputes that likely will become more frequent and injurious. 01' The
work of the WTO cannot be overstated in a nuclear-armed world, as
the body continues topromote respect and even amity among nations
10 2
with opposing philosophical goals or modes of governance.
Demagogues in the Unites States may decry the rise of China as a
geopolitical threat, 0 3 and extremists in Russia may play dangerous

3.1-.188.
4.20.
4.27.

96.
97.
98.

Id.
Id.
Id.

99.

"The United States is pleased that the figure arrived at by the
arbitrator is over 100 times lower than Antigua's claim," said Sean
Spicer, a spokesman for U.S. Trade Representative .... Mark Mendel,
the lawyer who led the case for Antigua, welcomed the right to crossretaliate by suspending the intellectual property rights of U.S.
business interests.

Jonathan Lynn, Antigua Triumphs in U.S. Gambling Case, REUTERS, Dec. 21, 2007,
available at http://www.reuters.com/article/companyNewsAndPR/idUSL216015742007
1221.

See Rufus Yerxa, The Power of the WTO Dispute Settlement System, in KEY
100.
ISSUES IN WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT: THE FIRST TEN YEARS, supra note 17, at 3, 3-4
(explaining that the basic dilemma which the WTO attempts to resolve is "to develop
an adjudication process that respects national sovereignty yet gives Members a
compelling reason to comply with its decisions").
See Renato Ruggiero, The WTO: Ten Years After its Establishment, in THE
101.
WTO AT TEN: THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM, supra note 15,

at 13, 19-22 (discussing the importance of ensuring that the reach of the WTO
accounts for the burgeoning markets of fast-growing economies such as China).
102.
See generally id. (discussing the progress of the WTO in creating a global
community).
For an example of the ways in which the geopolitical priorities of China and
103.
the United States have shifted, see Parag Khanna, Waving Goodbye to Hegemony, N.Y.
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games of brinksmanship with other great powers, but trade keeps
politicians' fingers off "the button. ' 10 4 The WTO offers an astounding
rate of compliance for an organization with no standing army and no
real power to enforce its decisions, suggesting that governments
recognize the value of maintaining the international construct of the
105
WTO.
In order to promote voluntary compliance, the WTO must
maintain a high level of credibility. 106 Nations must perceive the
WTO as the most reasonable option for dispute resolution or fear that
the WTO wields enough influence to enforce sanctions. 10 7 The
arbitrators charged with performing the substantive work of the
WTO by negotiating, compromising, and issuing judgments are
keenly aware of the responsibility they have to uphold the
organization's credibility. 108
Credibility is lost where a supranational organization appears
irredeemably partisan or where nations lack a sense of obligation to
give effect to the organization's judgments.1 0 9 GATT, the precursor to

TIMES, Jan. 27, 2008, at Mag.36, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/27/
magazine/27world-t.html?ref=magazine&pagewanted=all.
104.
For a discussion of the tacit acknowledgement of interconnectedness
between the U.S. and Russia, see Dmitri Trenin, A Less IdeologicalAmerica, 31 WASH.
Q. 117, 122-123 (Autumn 2008).
Judith Goldstein & Richard Steinberg, Negotiate or Litigate? Effects of
105.
WTO JudicialDelegation on U.S. Trade Politics, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 257, 27576 (2008).
See Rufus Yerxa, supra note 100, at 4 ("The WTO System works only to the
106.
extent Members want it to work, and only if they decide that compliance is in their
overall economic interest. It therefore rests on the credibility of the rules, and also on
the credibility of the dispute settlement decisions."); see also DEBRA P. STEGER, PEACE
THROUGH TRADE: BUILDING THE WTO 290-91 (2004) (linking issues of the WTO's
"external legitimacy" to the effectiveness of the institutional decision).
107.
The goal of the WTO is to prevent unilateral decisions as to the
justifiability of trade retaliation, a goal which can only be upheld by global adherence
to the WTO and condemnation of unilateral retaliation outside it. See Gabrielle
Marceau, Consultations and the Panel Process in the WTO, in KEY ISSUES IN WTO
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT: THE FIRST TEN YEARS, supra note 17, at 29, 30-31; see also
Marcelo de Paiva Abreu, Trade in Manufactures: The Outcome of the Uruguay Round
and Developing Country Interests, in THE URUGUAY ROUND AND THE DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES, supra note 12, at 59, 69 (discussing the importance of "the WTO's capacity
to 'create a level playing field among contracting parties of different sizes and
heterogeneous bargaining power").
108.
See Peter van den Bossche, The Makings of the 'World Trade Court,' in KEY
ISSUES IN WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT: THE FIRST TEN YEARS, supra note 17, at 63, 76-

78.
See Robert Howse & Susan Esserman, The Dispute Settlement System and
109.
Multilateralism, in THE WTO AT TEN: THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE DISPUTE
SETTLEMENT SYSTEM, supra note 15, at 61, 66 ("Consistency, continuity, and coherence

are enormously important in maintaining a healthy balance between the political and
legal institutions of the WTO. They strongly discourage rumours and accusations that
judges are deciding cases on the basis of regional, national or other kinds of 'political'
affiliations.").
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the WTO, could not approach the level of effectiveness of the WTO
due to the system's close ties to the interests of the developed
nations. 110 Developing nations saw no advantage associated with
participation in GATT."' Thus, a secondary organizational goal of
the WTO was to create a system to accurately reflect the changing
112
nature of economic development.
To some extent, developed economies may feel a sense of
responsibility to help developing and less-developed nations who
desire material prosperity; 113 however, WTO compliance and
participation need not rest on humanitarian considerations alonethe rise of previously imperiled economies such as India demonstrates
the continual flux of the global economy and the correlating
incentives. 114 Although developed nations frequently feel a sense of
responsibility to nations whose people live in poverty, developed
nations also recognize the advantages of incorporating developing
economies into the global trade system and encouraging peaceful
115
trade within and among such economies.
Accordingly, the interests of developing nations have garnered a
considerable amount of attention within the organization'1 6 and the
critical literature surrounding the undertakings of the WTO.1 1 7 The

110.
See Marceau, supra note 107, at 45 (indicating that developing countries
have begun to use the dispute resolution system with increasing rapidity, more
remarkable in context of the past: "Their participation in the WTO dispute settlement
system is remarkable when compared with the old GATT, where disputes usually
involved only developed countries.").
111.
See Evans & de Tarso Pereira, supra note 17, at 264 (noting that even
today, developing nations' "uncertainty about gains to be obtained by use of the
system" serves as a disincentive to "participating actively" in the dispute resolution
system).
112.
See Ruggiero, supra note 101, at 13-14 (indicating that, in contrast to the
GATT, the WTO has become "a truly global organization" thanks in part to the changes
wrought in 1994).
113.
See Enrique Baron Crespo, From Doha to Hong Kong and Beyond, in THE
WTO AT TEN: THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM, supra note 15,

at 23, 24 ("[Clivil society and public opinion call for an international trade system that
promotes more attention to poverty reduction, the promotion of labour standards,
public health, a cleaner environment, education, and so on.").
114.
See Ruggiero, supra note 101, at 17 (explaining some of the implications of
the rise of India and China in context of the global trading system); see also Will
Martin & L. Alan Winters, The Uruguay Round: A Milestone for the Developing
Countries, in THE URUGUAY ROUND AND THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, supra note 12,
at 1, 1 (noting the skyrocketing growth of developing countries' economies).
115.
Ruggiero, supra note 101, at 17 (noting that, absent inclusion in the trading
system, rising nations such as India and China will develop preferential trading
agreements along potentially questionable lines).
116.
See Supachai Panitchpakdi, The WTO at Ten: Building on Ten Years of
Achievements, in THE WTO AT TEN: THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT

SYSTEM, supra note 15, at 7, 11 (stating that increasing prosperity in developing
.countries in the best interest of all countries).
117.
See, e.g., Bown & Hoekman, supra note 13, at 863 (focusing on the costs of
the WTO's litigation process).
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participation of developing nations has increased, but not
sufficiently. 118 The global trading system (both the WTO as an
institution and the countries with an economic stake in a smoothlyfunctioning global economy) must work to encourage these nations to
utilize the availability of WTO proceedings as a means of resolving
economic disputes. 119 The decision in Antigua-Gambling has an
impact analogous to a marketing campaign-promoting incentives for
developing countries to join the WTO. 120 If Antigua can successfully
challenge the U.S. refusal to comply with WTO arbitration, 121 and if
there are mechanisms in place to enable Antigua to effect meaningful
change in U.S. economic, 122 then the WTO truly is a forum where
each member nation can expect a fair remedy.
However, the WTO cannot compromise fairness and disregard
precedent in the interest of sending a signal to developing
economies. 123
Balancing a multitude of factors and competing
interests means that few, if any, WTO decisions can be characterized
as a reversal of policy or even a watershed 'moment. 1 24 Instead,

118.
See Martin & Winters, supra note 114, at 1 (contrasting the participation of
developing nations in the Uruguay Round versus their lack of participation in the
"seven previous GATT rounds"). For the proposition that the WTO still has significant
work to do in order to achieve equal representation of developing countries, see MARY
E. FOOTER, AN INSTITUTIONAL AND NORMATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE WORLD TRADE

ORGANIZATION 115-16 (2006) (discussing the problems stemming from the
development of the current WTO structure as an expansion, without sufficient
overhaul, of the GATT's form as a "multilateral treaty" between dominant developed
economies).
119.
See Evans & de Tarso Pereira, supranote 17, at 264.
Participation of developing countries in disputes has been increasing over time.
However this is true for only a limited number of developing countries ....
many developing countries claim that they currently face almost
insurmountable obstacles to participating actively in the system. This is
usually attributed to a lack of financial and human resources . . . insufficient
knowledge of the applicable rules, and uncertainty about gains to be obtained
from use of the system.
Id.; see also STOLL & SCHORKOPF, supra note 3, at 14-15 (indicating that incorporating
developing countries is an institutional goal of the WTO).
120.
See Evans & de Tarso Pereira, supra note 17, at 264 (indicating that
"uncertainty about gains to be obtained from use of the system" is one of the key causes
of developing countries' reluctance to full participation in the WTO).
121.
See 22.6 Panel Report, supra note 1, 1.4 (indicating that Antigua pursued
22.6 arbitration subsequent to the decision by the Art. 21.5 compliance panel that the
United States had not complied with the DSB's recommendations).
122.
See id. 4.30 (defining the goal of the 22.6 arbitration to be, in part, to help
the aggrieved nation find a remedy which will ensure that the non-complying nation
feels the need to change its policies).
123.
See Howse & Esserman, supra note 109, at 65 (noting that "consistency and
coherence" are the two significant goals of the WTO).
124.
See John Magnus, Compliance with WTO Dispute Settlement Decisions, in
KEY ISSUES IN WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT: THE FIRST TEN YEARS, supra note 17, at
242, 249 (noting that the decision has to be perceived as a legitimate exercise of WTO
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The Antiguachange progresses slowly and incrementally. 125
Gambling decision does not spring from the ether, but builds up on
the groundwork laid in the 22.6 arbitration decision in European
Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of

Bananas(EC-BananasII1).126
Why, then, is Antigua-Gambling a particularly significant case?
It is important because the case cements the EC-Bananas III remedy,
which authorizes intellectual property violations for nations seeking
127
to retaliate effectively against a more powerful developed economy.
Furthermore, as set out in the 22.6 Arbitrator's decision, the general
standards necessary to support retaliation under TRIPS are not
difficult for a developing economy to prove. 128 The decision in
Antigua-Gambling may indicate that the TRIPS retaliation remedy
on course to become the remedy of choice for developing nations
seeking to enforce judgments against much larger economies for
129
whom they do not provide particularly important goods or services.
Additional subtleties of the opinion could be interpreted as
signals to developing countries that the WTO sympathizes with the
difficulty of obtaining a remedy and stands ready to modify the
system.
The decision includes a dissenting opinion 13 0-an
unprecedented move by a body that has resolutely maintained an
appearance of agreement among the arbitrators. 13 1 Altogether, the
implications of the decision indicate an important transitional step in
Thus, despite the
the evolution of the global trading system.
potentially disappointing pecuniary impact of the decision, developing
countries should view the Antigua-Gambling decision as encouraging.
Despite the benefits of sending signals in support of developing
countries, the decision is not ultimately beneficial to the stability of
international trade if the specific remedy it authorizes is misguided
and harmful. Thus, the next Part centers on the implications of
suspension of TRIPS obligations: To what extent does the decision
increase the likelihood that TRIPS suspension will become a standard

power by the nation against whom it is enforced, to prevent significant compliance
issues).
125.
See Evans & de Tarso Pereira, supra note 17, at 266-68 (discussing the
WTO's use of gradual "evolution" instead of drastic "revolution").
126.
See 22.6 Panel Report, supra note 1, 7 4.106-107 (indicating that ECBananas III provides guidance in the interpretive work of the arbitrators).
127.
Id. 5.11.
See id. IT 4.72-.116 (describing the conditions for seeking retaliation).
128.
129.
Id.
5.6-13.
130.
See id. $T 3.62-73 (dissenting from multiple points of the majority
arbitrators' conclusions).
131.
See van den Bossche, supra note 108, at 76 (noting that only two previous
reports contained an individual opinion, and concluding that despite the probable
existence of dissent on more than two occasions, the Appellate Body has chosen to
present a seemingly united front).
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remedy? Further, what are the implications for the trading system
arising from the availability of such a remedy?

III. ANTIGUA-GAMBLING

EXTENDS AND VALIDATES THE
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY VIOLATION REMEDY SET
OUT IN ECUADOR BANANAS

A. Brief Overview of the TRIPS Treaty and the
Implications of Suspension

TRIPS establishes protections for intellectual property rights,
132
especially for holders of a copyright, patent, trademark, or design.
Signatories to the TRIPS Agreement assume obligations to create and
enforce laws to protect rights holders. 133 Domestic laws may vary
among signatories, but they must comply with certain minimum
standards of protection set forth in TRIPS. 134 When Ecuador
requested permission to suspend its TRIPS obligations, it
contemplated suspending specific portions of the TRIPS Agreement
likely to affect the European Union. 135 In contrast, Antigua did not
specify the nature or extent of its TRIPS suspensions, asserting that
13 6
such information was irrelevant to the 22.6 Arbitrator's decision.

132.

Members shall give effect to the provisions of this Agreement.
Members may, but shall not be obliged to, implement in their law more
extensive protection than is required by this Agreement, provided that
such protection does not contravene the provisions of this Agreement.
Members shall be free to determine the appropriate method of
implementing the provisions of this Agreement within their own legal
system and practice.

Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, art. 1.1, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C,
1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement], available at
http://www.wto.org/englishldocs-e/legal e/27-trips.pdf.
133.
Id. arts. 41, 61. Although the TRIPS Agreement permits both a "transition
period" and special treatment of Least-Developed Countries, the goal is to have a
cohesive IP protection system in which all signatories equally participate. Id. arts. 6567.
134.
Id. arts. 41-63.
135.
EC-Bananas III Panel Report, supra note 4, Part I.A.4 (detailing the sectors
in which Ecuador intended to suspend concessions: copyright on sound recordings,
geographical indications, and industrial designs).
136.
See 22.6 Panel Report, supra note 1,
5.2 ("Antigua's request does not
place any value on GATS and TRIPS concessions and does not explain what
mechanisms Antigua intends to use to ensure that the level of suspension does not
exceed the level of nullification and impairment."); see also id.
5.4-.5 (declaring that
Antigua does not have to specify the scope of concessions in order to have its request for
the concession authorized); id. 5.6 (noting that Antigua's only specification was of the
broad sectors in which it would suspend obligations: copyright, trademark, industrial
designs, patents, protection of undisclosed information).
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The Arbitrator in Antigua-Gambling did not seek further elaboration
from Antigua. 137 However, the decision did incorporate significant
portions of EC-BananasIII (a 22.6 Arbitration), referring explicitly to
the sections in which the arbitrator addressed proper methods for
Ecuador to suspend TRIPS obligations. 138
Such inclusion was
noteworthy because there is little in terms of "precedent" in WTO
39
jurisprudence.1
B. Broad Impact of EC-BananasIII and Antigua-Gambling
on TRIPS Suspension Remedy
Although the WTO agreements authorize a nation to seek
retaliation under a separate treaty to which both the offending
country and suffering country are mutual parties, 140 Ecuador was the
first nation to seek WTO authorization to retaliate by suspending
provisions of the TRIPS Agreement. 14 1 However, Ecuador never
actually implemented TRIPS retaliation because it reached a
settlement with the U.S. before taking retaliatory action. 142 Thus,
the decision in EC-Bananas III left certain questions unanswered:
How committed is the WTO to authorizing this remedy? Would
discussions of the inherent instability of IP violations as a retaliatory
tactic influence the willingness of the WTO to support the remedy?
How would the retaliation be calculated, given the disputed
valuations of the intellectual property rights at issue? What is the
likelihood that retaliation would secure compliance or settlementthat is, can suspension of TRIPS obligations effectively transform the

137.
Id. 5.9.
138.
See id.
5.11 (including a reference, in footnote 343, to "EC-Bananas III
(Ecuador) (Article 22.6-EC), section V (paras. 139 to 165)").
139.
See id. (stating that the remarks made by arbitrators were relevant). For
the proposition that WTO decisions have little precedential value, see Giorgio
Sacerdoti, The Role of Lawyers in the WTO Dispute Settlement System, in KEY ISSUES
IN WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT: THE FIRST TEN YEARS, supra note 17, at 125, 127; see
also MARION PANIZZON, GOOD FAITH IN THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE WTO 357 (2006)

(noting that Panel Reports and AB Reports may "create legitimate expectations" that
future decision-makers will take account of those reports under similar factual
circumstances, but that "despite creating legitimate expectations, such prior reports
are not precedents, because they are not binding on all WTO Member states . . . only
between the parties to a particular dispute").
140.
See 22.6 Panel Report, supra note 1,
4.1 ("Antigua requested to be
authorized to suspend concessions and other obligations under the GATS and the
TRIPS Agreement, in accordance with the principles and procedures of Article 22.3 of
the DSU."); see also General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. 22.3, Oct. 30, 1947,
61 Stat. A-3, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT] (allowing countries to seek
authorization from the WTO to suspend concessions under treaties to which both
parties are signatories).
141.
WTO Compliance Panel Awards Antigua $21 Million in Retaliation, 26
INSIDE U.S. TRADE, JAN. 4, 2008, at 1, 3.

142.

Id.
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find compliance more
incentives of developed nations such that they143
profitable than allowing violations to continue?
Certainly some of these questions remain unanswered. The WTO
has yet to determine how to calculate the value of intellectual
property violations. 144 Antigua is delaying such calculations in hopes
145
of entering into a settlement agreement with the United States.
The success or failure of settlement negotiations will reveal a great
deal about the internal calculations of the U.S. and to what extent
U.S. industries feel threatened by the prospect of IP violations.
Nonetheless, the first two questions are answered by the 22.6
Arbitrator's Decision. The WTO will treat the TRIPS agreement as
any treaty falling within the domain of 22.3 of the GATS provision on
suspension of agreements. 146 The language of the 22.6 arbitration,
however, remains carefully neutral by noting only that Antigua has
fulfilled the required elements of proof to gain the right to suspend
TRIPS obligations under 22.3 of the GSU. 147 The very simplicity of
the Antiguan victory in the arbitration suggests that the WTO agrees
with Antigua that the somewhat asymmetrical nature of the remedy
makes it particularly well-suited for small economies.
C. Antigua-GamblingExpands the Flexible Standardof
Review and Burden of Proof of EC-BananasIII
In light of the manner in which the Antigua-Gambling 22.6
arbitration interpreted the requirements of Article 22.3, the decision
appears to be receptive to the hurdles faced by developing countries.
First, the decision applies a permissive "margin of appreciation"
standard of review to evaluate Antigua's choice to suspend under
TRIPS (instead of suspending under GATS). 148 Second, the decision

143.

See Yves Renouf, A Brief Introduction to Countermeasures in the WTO, in

KEY ISSUES IN WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT: THE FIRST TEN YEARS, supra note 17, at

110, 118-22 (detailing the process followed by the WTO's arbitrators, who try to induce
compliance through countermeasures which are designed to change the economic or
political calculations of the non-conforming country).
See 22.6 Panel Report, supra note 1, 1 5.7-.8 (demonstrating difficulties in
144.
valuation).
WTO Compliance Panel Awards Antigua $21 Million in Retaliation, supra
145.
note 141, at 3.
146.
22.6 Panel Report, supra note 1, 5.10
See id. at 4.60 ("Antigua could plausibly arrive at the conclusion that it
147.
was not practicable or effective for it to suspend concessions or other obligations under
the GATS in respect of Sector 10."); id. at 4.64 ("Antigua has taken into account the
relevant elements in subparagraph (d) of Article 22.3, in determining that it was not
practicable or effective for it to seek suspension in the GATS sector in which the
violation was found in accordance with subparagraph (b) of Article 22.3.").
Id. 4.16.
148.

1014

VANDERBILTJOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 42..993

adopts a flexible interpretation of the words "practical" and "effective"
149
to govern the application of Article 22.3 suspension.
1.

"Margin of Appreciation" and "Reasonableness" Guide the
Standard of Review for 22.3 Actions

Like the arbitrators in EC-Bananas III, the 22.6 arbitration
decision in Antigua-Gamblingbroadly construed the terms of Article
22.3.150 This expansive reading indicates that a country requesting
to suspend concessions under other agreements is entitled to a
"margin of appreciation.' 15 1 The margin of appreciation allows a
relatively lax "reasonableness" standard for the body reviewing
whether to grant the country the right to suspend concessions under
TRIPS, as guided by the language of Article 22.3:
We agree with the arbitrators in EC-Bananas III (Ecuador) that this
includes a determination "whether the complaining party in question
has considered the necessary facts objectively" and also "whether, on
the basis of these facts, it could plausibly arrive at the conclusion that
it was not practicable or effective to seek suspension within the same
sector under the same agreements, or only under another agreement
'1 5 2
provided that the circumstances were serious enough."

Affirming the standard for an Article 22.3 suspension along these
lines indicates a significant amount of flexibility for the complaining
country. For developing countries seeking an asymmetrical remedy,
a flexible "reasonableness" standard represents a significant benefit.
The very idea of a "standard of review" differs somewhat in the
international trade context from its usual connotations in the
domestic judicial context. 153 The domestic standard of review usually
refers to the manner in which an appellate court reviews the decision
of a lower court. 154 In contrast, use of the phrase by WTO bodies
usually refers to the level of deference that a WTO panel applies
when examining a national determination that certain trade
155
measures were merited.
Standard of review arises whenever a panel ... review[s] compliance of
a member's measure ....
[T]he question arises to what depth and with
what intensity the national determination should be reviewed. The
standard of review... defines the degree to which a panel should

149.
150.

Id.
Id.

151.

Id. T 4.18.

152.

Id.

153.

MATTHIAS OESCH, STANDARDS OF REVIEW IN WTO DISPUTE RESOLUTION 7

(2003).
154.
155.

4.17.

Id.
Id. at 13-14.
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'second-guess' the measure ..
156
law.

to determine ..

consisten[cy] with WTO

Thus, in the context of the Antigua-Gambling 22.6 arbitration
the standard of review referred to the level of scrutiny that
arbitrators would apply to Antigua's determination that it could not
57
suspend concessions to the U.S. under similar provisions of GATS.1
The level of scrutiny applied to such a crucial determination plays a
very significant role in the ultimate authorization of Antigua's (or any
country's) trade retaliation measures. Yet, the Dispute Settlement
Understanding (DSU) itself does not specify standards of review to be
158
used to examine the determinations of countries' trade measures.
Disagreements over proper standards nearly derailed the drafting of
the DSU itself, leading to an interesting result: the issue of applicable
standards of review was not included in the agreement at all and,
159
instead, was left to the panels to determine over time.
While certain norms have developed to address the standard of
160
review relevant to strictly factual determinations by countries,
''161
there is no consistent standard of review for "legal interpretations.
Given this murky history, the decision of the Antigua-Gambling
arbitrators to use a flexible standard of review is particularly
significant.
The use of "margin of appreciation" is an unusual choice in the
trade context 162 because it suggests that "the exact confines of market

156.

Id. at 13.

157.
22.6 Panel Report, supra note 1,
4.17-.18.
158.
See OESCH, supra note 153, at 6-7 (noting negotiators could not agree on
generally applicable standards of review); see also Steven P. Croley & John H. Jackson,

WTO Dispute Procedures, Standard of Review, and Deference to National Governments,
90 AM. J. INT'L L. 193, 199 (1996) ("There are no provisions in the DSU explicitly
concerning the 'standard of review' as such .. ").
159.
See OESCH, supra note 153, at 77-78 (detailing the history of the various
proposed standards of review for the DSU, all of which were rejected due to extreme
controversy among the drafting nations); see also Croley & Jackson, supra note 158, at
199 (discussing the history of the dispute over standards of review).
160.
See OESCH, supra note 153, at 89-92 (explaining that panels need to accord
deference to national authorities' findings); see also Croley & Jackson, supra note 158,
at 198 (indicating that there are fixed standards of review for factual determinations in
anti-dumping cases).
161.

The standard of review of legal interpretations addresses the question
to what extent panels and the Appellate Body should review legal
interpretation of WTO law as submitted and argued by national
authorities. While it seems clear that it falls, in principle, within the
panels' and the Appellate Body's competence to interpret the existing
provisions of the WTO agreements, it is far from settled whether they
nonetheless should accord a certain degree of deference towards legal
interpretations chosen and presented by a member.

OESCH, supra note 153, at 19.
162.
Id. at 51-54 (discussing the history of the concept of "margin of
appreciation," which is a term developed within the jurisprudence of the European
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access rights agreed upon in the WTO agreements [differ] in
substance and ambit in the various members of the WTO."'1 63 The
term-where previously used by the WTO-has usually incorporated
"deference ...to member states in their assessment and evaluation of
the factual evidence. '164 The motive for such a deferential standard
of review is usually an institutional determination by WTO
arbitrators that countries require sensitivity to their sovereign
determinations. 165 Language choices about proper standard of review
are far from accidental; they illustrate the balancing mechanism of
the WTO dispute resolution bodies, as the "standard of review
embodies a carefully drawn balance of jurisdictional and institutional
competences between WTO panels and Appellate Body on the one
166
hand and the judged entity.., on the other hand."'
What this means for Antigua, and for other developing countries,
is that the WTO has chosen to defer to such countries' determinations
that they cannot effectively retaliate against developed economies
using traditional means. Because "standards of review express a
deliberate allocation of power to decide upon factual and legal
issues,"1 67 such countries should recognize that the WTO has tacitly
acknowledged the problems of retaliation that these countries face
and has offered them a mechanism to rectify the situation.
2.

"Practical" and "Effective" Provide Flexibility for the Suspending
Country

Antigua's argument that it was "not practicable or effective" for
the country to suspend services or goods under GATS was largely
rooted in its calculation that the U.S. owed it approximately $3 billion
in damages, 168 an amount that did not signal retaliation by
Antigua. 169 Nevertheless, the 22.6 arbitration decision still found
authorization for the 22.3 action, 170 even where the amount at issue
was reduced to roughly $20 million. 171 Such a finding strengthens

Court of Human Rights and, in that context, refers to the differing cultural
understandings of human rights which may create differences in application of such
rights).
163.
Id. at 53.
164.
Id. at 54.
165.
Id. at 47.
166.
Id. at 233.
167.
Id. (emphasis added).
168.
22.6 Panel Report, supra note 1, 4.4.
169.
See id.
4.2-.3 (describing the amount requested by Antigua).
170.
See id.
4.82, 4.90 (acknowledging that Antigua has a dollar value of
imports sufficient to support a suspension of concessions, but concluding ultimately
that Antigua could reasonably decide that such suspensions would not be perceived by
the United States and would have a significant negative effect on Antigua).
171.
See id.
4.23-.24 (indicating that the significantly reduced level of
damages, 21 million dollars, would be taken into consideration by the arbitrators).
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the conclusion that the suspension of TRIPS could become a frequent
recourse for smaller economies.
The arbitration decision's definition of the word "effectiveness"
offers the strongest rationale for the decision to suspend obligations
under TRIPS.
The language of the decision itself tacitly
acknowledges that discussions of asymmetrical effectiveness
influence the choice by the arbitrators to authorize retaliatory action
under Article 22.3:
[T]he thrust of the "effectiveness" criterion empowers the party seeking
suspension to ensure that the impact of that suspension is strong and
has the desired result, namely to induce compliance by the Member
which fails to bring WTO-inconsistent measures into compliance with
DSB recommendations and rulings within a reasonable period of
172
time.

On its face, the language here only refers to the "effectiveness" of
suspension of obligations under the same sector or treaty in which the
violation occurred. 173 However, the underlying rationale-the reality
of the other nation's calculations must be taken into account by the
arbitrators-goes a long way towards affirming the use of
174
asymmetrical remedies.
The arbitrators, in considering the efficacy of TRIPS suspension,
evaluated the potential impact on Antigua if it to suspend concessions
under GATS. 175 The prevailing argument for Antigua asserted that
the Antiguan economy would suffer if the country was forced to find
another supplier for its imports. 176 However, the arbitrators also
considered less obvious impacts on Antigua's citizens in their analysis
of "practicality." 17 7 The least tangible negative impact was addressed
in the decision's consideration of Antigua's option to stop importing
American movies under the entertainment sector agreements of the
GATS. 178 In addition to the argument emphasizing the lack of impact
on the U.S., 179 a rationale for rejecting the movie embargo centered
on the damaging impact to Antiguans.i 0 Though the loss would be

172.
Id. 4.84.
173.
Id.
174.
Id.
175.
Id.
4.84-89 (addressing Antigua's arguments as to the relative
ineffectiveness of its suspension options under the various sectors of the GATT).
176.
Id. 4.87.
177.
Id. 4.48.
178.
Id. 4.94.
179.

Id.

[Antigua] states that it has been unable to "locate any statistical
sources" on trade in entertainment services and believes that such
trade is negligible in its overall volume. Antigua further considers that
suspension of concessions or other obligations in this sector "would ...
hav[e] virtually no impact on the United States at all."

4.48.
180.

Id.
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intangible, diminished entertainment options on the tiny island
nation represented a sufficiently significant side effect of retaliation
such that that Antigua could refuse to exercise the option on grounds
18
of impracticality. 1
Rather than construe "practical and effective" to mean "possible,"
the arbitrators examined the real implications of traditional
suspensions on the tiny developing economy, even taking into account
intangible external effects, in order to accept Antigua's determination
that straightforward suspension under the GATS sectors could not
provide a reasonable solution.' 8 2 In conjunction with a flexible
standard of review, construing "practical and effective" to take
account of the imbalance between developing economies and
developed economies means that developing economies will almost
always be able to prove that GATS suspension will not provide an
adequate remedy.
Naturally, then, the question must be asked whether the WTO is
correct in its movement toward the increased use of the asymmetrical
remedy of TRIPS suspension. The answer to this question depends
on whether the benefit to developing nations of achieving significant
and effective remedies against large economies justifies the possible
abuse of the privilege or the impermissible expansion of the legal
83
violations of TRIPS.

IV. EXTENSION OF THE TRIPS SUSPENSION REMEDY Is NET
POSITIVE FOR THE TRADING SYSTEM

The benefits of using TRIPS violations as Article 22.3 remedies
are twofold. First, the wronged country gains a conspicuous remedy
against a powerful economy that ordinarily has little incentive to
84
honor its obligations under an agreement to a developing economy.'
Second, the TRIPS suspension remedy avoids unintended side effects
for the citizens of the retaliating country.' 8 5 The Antigua-Gambling
decision indicates that such effects bear significantly on the

181.
See id. ("Antigua further considers that suspension of concessions or other
obligations in this sector 'would most likely impair the already limited entertainment
options available to Antiguan citizens ... .
182.
Id. 4.105.
183.
The United States raises this argument in their argument against allowing
Antigua to suspend its obligations under TRIPS. See id.
5.3 ("The United States
asserts that an authorization to suspend TRIPS concessions could encourage rampant
and uncontrolled IPR piracy, and that such an outcome would serve no legitimate
interests of any WTO Member.").
184.
See id.
4.2 (detailing the insignificance of the Antiguan economy and the
value of the Antiguan export market as compared to the overall economic dominance of
the United States).

185.

Mary Kopczynski, Robin Hood Versus the Bullies: Software Piracy and

Developing Countries, 33 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 299, 313 (2007).
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calculation of what constitutes an "effective" remedy.1 8 6 Despite
worries of rampant, WTO-sanctioned piracy,18 7 the protections
already in TRIPS itself, or created as a corollary of the suspension
remedy, will guard against unfettered reprisal.
A. TRIPS Suspension Represents a Real Threat to
Developed Countries, Yet Has Minimal Effects
on Developing Economies
In contrast to straightforward trade remedies, which may impose
high costs on developing countries seeking retaliation,18 8 intellectual
property protections are far more valuable to developed economies
than to developing countries. The developing world has significant
incentives to violate intellectual property protections illegally.18 9
The most likely external effect of TRIPS protection suspension
would be a chilling effect on investment in the suspending country as
foreign investors fear transferring technology to or establishing a
business in a country known to violate intellectual property rights. 190
The U.S. raised this argument in press releases discussing the
implications of the 22.6 arbitration decision. 191
However, "the
magnitude of the impact of weak [IP] protection on FDI decisions is
193
debatable"' 92 and appears limited to select industries.
TRIPS suspensions fulfill the central thesis of the retaliation
strategy: to harm the offending country while improving the position
of the retaliating country, 194 and, at least in the case of Antigua,

186.
See supra Part III.C.2.
187.
The United States has repeatedly invoked the specter of sanctioned piracy
in its press releases about the Antigua-Gambling case. See, e.g., Press Release, Office
of the U.S. Trade Representative, Statement on Internet Gambling (Dec. 21, 2007),
available at http://www.ustr.gov/DocumentLibrary/PressReleases/2007/December/
Statement onInternetGambling.html [hereinafter Internet Gambling Press Release].
The U.S. also raised this argument formally during the 22.6 Arbitration. See 22.6 Panel
Report, supra note 1, 5.3.
188.
See 22.6 Panel Report, supra note 1,
4.30, 4.84-.89 (examining Antigua's
determination that it was neither practical nor effective to suspend concessions under
the same sectors of the GATS, because of the negative external effects to Antigua's
economy).
189.
See Kopczynski, supra note 185, at 313 (listing six reasons why developing
countries choose not to enforce IP laws).
190.
Carlos A. Primo Braga, Trade-Related Intellectual Property Issues, in TIHE
URUGUAY ROUND AND THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, supra note 12, at 341, 362-63.
191.
See Internet Gambling Press Release, supra note 187 ("[T]o do so [suspend

IP protections] would undermine Antigua's claimed intentions of becoming a leader in
legitimate electronic commerce, and would severely discourage foreign investment in
the Antiguan economy.").
192.

Braga, supra note 190, at 362.

193.
194.

See id. at 362-63.
See Brendan McGivern, Implementation of Panel and Appellate Body

Rulings: An Overview, in KEY ISSUES IN WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT: THE FIRST TEN

YEARS, supra note 17, at 98, 99 (quoting and explaining the DSU's statement that
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represent the only obligations that can be suspended without
significant economic backlash.
However, the rationale for upholding TRIPS is well-reasoned and
vital to developed countries' continued participation in the trading
system. 195 "Western nations . . . consider enforcement of intellectual
property rights to be a non-negotiable issue in WTO agreements" for
their importance to their citizens and economies. 196 Without the
assurance that WTO commitments include protection of intellectual
property rights, and without the hope to recoup costs, industries,
especially the software industry, cannot afford research and
development. 197 Ultimately, though, the value of TRIPS suspensions
as a highly effective remedy justifies the costs imposed in terms of the
preservation of rights under TRIPS.
B. TRIPS Suspension CreatesPressure to Settle
Discussion of TRIPS suspension must also include consideration
of pressure to settle through private negotiation. A foreseeable effect
of TRIPS suspension as a remedy will inevitably be a marked
increase in developed countries' incentives to enter settlement
198
negotiations with developing countries.
The pressure to settle necessarily implicates the legitimacy of
the remedy. While settlement may reduce some of the practical
difficulties of TRIPS retaliation to hypotheticals, pressure to settle
also means that blackmail and coercion could potentially undermine
While TRIPS suspension is
the legitimacy of the remedy.
intentionally asymmetrical because it empowers weaker economies
through direct means, the trading system cannot overcompensate for
developing countries by granting a license to steal.
The pressure to settle must fulfill the underlying goals of the
WTO in order to be a legitimate goal of WTO dispute resolution. In
many ways, increased pressure to settle does fulfill those goals. As a
result, the actual number of TRIPS violations could be relatively

compensation and concession are only means to an end, that end being full compliance
with the WTO); see also Yerxa, supra note 100, at 4 (noting that members must find
compliance "in their overall economic interest" for the system to work properly).
195.
See Kopczynski, supra note 185, at 309.
196.
Id.
197.
Id.
198.
In contrast to the stakes for developed countries, developing countries have
strong incentives not to enforce TRIPS. See id. at 313.
[S]ix reasons why developing countries choose not to enforce IP laws: 1) a lack
of resources, 2) a lack of cost-benefit tradeoffs, 3) a need for economic growth
and protection of domestic industry, 4) a different cultural value, 5) "a 'Robin
Hood' mentality of justifiably robbing the rich to help the needy," and, finally,
6) suspicion of Western intentions.
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small, potentially balancing some of the arguments against
permitting TRIPS to be suspended. Just as the actual number of
trade retaliations has been small relative to the number of cases
brought to the WTO, 1 99 the number of actual TRIPS suspensions
could be minute.
As with any trade system, the WTO prefers that countries avoid
the violation of rights in the first place. However, international
economic law faces the serious challenge of securing compliance from
economies too large to feel much pain from noncompliance. 200 If the
WTO credibly endorses a damaging, asymmetrical remedy for small
countries, the mere presence of that remedy could have a balancing
effect as the conduct and policies of large nations transform to avoid
confrontation with smaller economies.
Although compliance must be an important consideration for
WTO arbitrators balancing the interests of developed and developing
20 1
If
countries, it cannot be the sole justification for a trade remedy.
the pressure to settle is insurmountable and the damage of the
TRIPS suspension far outweighs the value of the offending domestic
law, then the arbitrators should reconsider or abandon the TRIPS
suspension remedy. "Inducing compliance," severed from notions of
comity and discussions of the original violation, is a dangerous
20 2
rationale for a trade remedy.
Authorizing a remedy that guarantees, rather than encourages,
settlement is a troubling example of severing proportionality
considerations from discussions of remedy. 20 3 The WTO documents
do not contemplate that remedies be structured with the goal of
inducing compliance; instead, the language addressing suspensions of
concessions is focused on proportionality and equality of the

199.

See Bruce Wilson, The WTO Dispute Settlement System and Its Operation,

in KEY ISSUES IN WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT: THE FIRST TEN YEARS, supra note 17, at

15, 23 (noting that in the first ten years of its operation, the Dispute Settlement Body
only heard sixteen requests for retaliation, and only granted seven of those requests
through arbitration).
200.
Decisions which authorize countermeasures begin with an analysis of the
best way to induce compliance. See id. at 346-52 (discussing the development of the
idea that the primary goal of countermeasures is to induce compliance); Renouf, supra
note 143, at 120 (discussing the rhetoric and methods which arbitrators have used in
attempting to secure compliance, and noting that although "inducing effective
compliance" is not a term found in actual WTO documents, the concept is a cornerstone
of decisions authorizing countermeasures).
201.
See DAVID PALMETER, THE WTO AS A LEGAL SYSTEM: ESSAYS ON
INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW AND POLICY 352 (2003) ("Inducing compliance is the first,

but not the only, requirement of international law that needs to be fulfilled before
reprisals are found permissible. A countermeasure will not be 'appropriate,' even if it
effectively induces compliance, if it is disproportionate.").
202.
See id. at 351-52 (discussing the implications of the notion of "inducing
compliance" upon the "delicately negotiated balance" between sovereignty and WTO
obligations).
203.
Id. at 358-59.
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remedy. 20 4 In theory, the offending country should be empowered to
accept the cost of non-compliance and continue to the violation
(analogous to the rationale underlying "efficient breach" in contract
theory). 20 5 Invoking the rationale of "induced compliance" could
potentially increase demands for ever-expanding penalties and upset
the balance that exists between WTO institutional legitimacy and the
national sovereignty of its members. 20 6
A country's ability to
"efficiently breach" WTO obligations when domestic economic
20 7
considerations demand such action is a key aspect of sovereignty.
If the WTO begins to place its own institutional demands above the
interests of its member nations, it risks a severe backlash and
20 8
eventually its own destruction.
In light of these potential issues, the WTO arbitrators should
focus on issues of equivalence and proportionality to avoid the
'20 9
If
perception that the WTO has resorted to "stiffer penalties.
Antigua retaliates under TRIPS, the WTO must be attentive to calls
for increased monitoring of the retaliatory conduct and must
aggressively ensure that the retaliation does not exceed the
authorized $21 million. While many factors outlined below suggest
that pressure to settle will remain at an ideal level rather than
crossing into coercive territory, awareness of the potential problems
associated with retaliation help ensure that the remedy will be
applied carefully and with sensitivity to implications for the trading
system as a whole.
The problem of increased pressure to settle is that parties may
remain on unequal footing. The specter of blackmail, authorized by a
system dedicated to fairness, is no light matter. This tension will
accompany any discussion of TRIPS suspension as asymmetrical
empowerment-at least until a system for imposing the requisite
award develops. The 22.6 arbitration decision acknowledges the
challenge that the WTO will face in calculating the value of
individual TRIPS violations:

204.
Id. at 347-48.
205. Joel P. Trachtman, The WTO Cathedral, 43 STAN. J. INT'L L. 127, 152
(2007). For a contrary argument that inducing compliance is a legitimate, independent
rationale because WTO obligations carry independent legal force, see STEGER, supra
note 106, at 245-49.
206.
PALMETER, supranote 201, at 357-59.
207.
See Trachtman, supra note 205, at 152. Trachtman further notes that
efficient breach is "normatively" a good function which the trading system should
allow: "[N]ormatively speaking, the goal should be to induce compliance when
compliance is efficient, and breach when it is not." Id.
208.
PALMETER, supranote 201, at 358-59.
209.
See id. at 358 ("If arbitrators keep asserting that the purpose of
countermeasures is to induce compliance, further calls for 'stiffer penalties' are a
virtual certainty.").
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We . . . note that the suspension of obligations under the TRIPS
Agreement may involve more complex means of implementation than,
for example, the imposition of higher import duties on goods, and that
the exact assessment of the value of the rights affected by the
210
suspension is also likely to be more complex.

No answer to this conundrum has emerged that satisfies all
criticism, although the beginnings of an answer may exist. Though
the Antigua-Gambling decision may illustrate the acceptance and
extension of the remedy of the suspension of the TRIPS agreement, it
falls short of an announcement that the WTO will authorize this
The WTO already views retaliatory
remedy in any situation.
212
211
and a poor substitute for compliance,
measures as a "last resort"
and there is no sign that Antigua-Gambling overturns this
Antigua's damages were severely
institutional reluctance. 213
limited, 214 and the arbitrators required specific proof of factual
circumstances that recourse to suspensions under another treaty
would produce the most effective remedy. 215 Recourse to another
treaty for suspensions is a rare remedy, 2 16 and the Antigua-Gambling
decision does not expand the frequency of the remedy in all instances,
but clarifies the appropriate context for such a remedy. 217 This may
not fully answer the charge that the remedy's coercive pressure
amounts to blackmail. However, it does suggest that developed
countries ought not assume that the WTO will rush to endorse TRIPS
suspension, and can thus rely on the chances of success in winning
the argument to bar application of the remedy.
C. EC-BananasIII Offers Strategies to Minimize Unfettered Piracy
Although the 22.6 arbitration decision does not address problems
of implementation, 218 the arbitrators refer in a footnote to the
extensive analysis set out by the arbitrators in EC-Bananas III to
answer certain questions about the mechanics of the TRIPS
suspension remedy. 219 Because the EC-BananasIII panel considered

22.6 Panel Report, supra note 1, 1 5.10.
210.
McGivern, supra note 194, at 106.
211.
See Renouf, supra note 143, at 112 ("Countermeasures are not a legally
212.
acceptable substitute for compliance under the DSU ...").
22.6 Panel Report, supra note 1, 7 4.22, 4.92.
213.
See id. T 4.22 (noting, in the context of the decision to authorize TRIPS
214.
suspension, that Antigua's damages had been recalculated to $21 million).
See id. T 4.92 ("Antigua has not limited itself to general assertions as to the
215.
size of its economy, in itself or relative to the US economy.").
See Renouf, supra note 143, at 115 (identifying only three cases where
216.
"requesting parties have sought authorization to suspend 'other obligations' than tariff
").
concessions ....
22.6 Panel Report, supra note 1, 7 5.7-.10.
217.
5.9-10.
Id.
218.
Id. T 5.10 n.342.
219.
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the TRIPS suspension remedy as a question of first impression, basic
questions had to be answered in order to advise the countries
220
involved and to legitimately authorize the remedy.
The EC-Bananas III panel, addressing the question of scope,
asserted that the suspension remedy could only apply to the work of a
national of the target country. 22 1 The arbitrators suggested that the
TRIPS privileges be suspended only for property wholly owned by
persons of the relevant nationality to avoid infringing the rights of
non-affected TRIPS signatories. 222 The decision pointed to treaties
associated with the TRIPS agreement, particularly those setting out
the definitions of "scope," as relevant to determining whose
223
nationality mattered in the context of retaliation.
The strongest argument against TRIPS suspension is that
violations sanctioned in one country will spread widely with the
dissemination of the unauthorized copies of the "objects of piracy"
(that is, the copyrighted or patented material). 224 Antigua makes
such veiled threats with language that at least implies that Antigua
seeks to capitalize on American producers' fear of widespread
piracy. 225 However, the EC-Bananas III arbitrators attempted to
address this argument by pointing out that the duties of all the other
parties to TRIPS are not suspended 226 and that one of those duties is
to prevent circulation of materials copied without proper
permission. 227
The arbitrators further indicated that TRIPS
suspension authorized through the WTO is not an acceptable
substitute for proper permission to copy obtained through TRIPSapproved means:
An authorization of a suspension requested by Ecuador does of course
not entitle other WTO Members to derogate from any of their
obligations under the TRIPS Agreement. Consequently, such DSB

220.
EC-Bananas III Panel Report, supra note 4, 139.
221.
Id.
141.
222.
Id.
140. The report cites art. 1.3 of the TRIPS Agreement as to the
persons protected by TRIPS:
In respect of the relevant intellectual property right, the nationals of other
Members shall be understood as those natural or legal persons that would meet
the criteria for eligibility for protection provided for in the Paris Convention
(1967), the Berne Convention (1971), the Rome Convention and the Treaty on
Intellectual Property in Respect of Integrated Circuits, were all Members of the
WTO members of those conventions.
Id.
223.
Id.
144.
224.
The United States particularly levels this criticism in its press releases
which discuss the case. See Internet Gambling Press Release, supra note 187.
225.
See, e.g., WTO Compliance Panel Awards Antigua $21 Million in
Retaliation, supra note 141, at 3-4; Antigua Triumphs in U.S. Gambling Case, supra
note 99.
226.
EC-Bananas III Panel Report, supra note 4, 153.
227.
Id. 154.
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authorization to Ecuador cannot be construed by other WTO Members
to reduce their obligations under Part III of the TRIPS Agreement in
2 28
regard to imports entering their customs territories.

Accordingly, the EC-Bananas III decision indicated that the
suspension would only be authorized within Ecuador's domestic
market. 229 This safeguard certainly does not give U.S. rights holders
can treat suspension lightly. Yet, countries theoretically would be
able to keep "distortions in third-country markets '23 0 in check if
TRIPS signatories were diligent in satisfying their TRIPS obligations
with regard to goods coming from Antigua. If Antigua was required
to keep very close track of each of its copyright violations, 231 the
monitoring system that the country used to identify their "legitimate
piracy" could make it easier to track those same copyrighted goods
and make sure they stayed within domestic borders.
Monitoring and enforcement systems are, unfortunately,
untested territory because Ecuador settled instead of suspending
TRIPS.2 32 However, Ecuador's proposed mechanism is an indication
exist. 23 3 In EC-Bananas III, the decision noted
that viable options
"with approval"23 4 that Ecuador had proposed to implement a
coherent and likely effective structure for monitoring and calculating
the value of continued violations, in addition to the "actual impact" of
initial violations. 235 If it were to suspend TRIPS, Ecuador intended to
establish a licensing system whereby companies or individuals who
wanted to produce materials with an EC copyright would instead
apply for a license from the Ecuadorian government. 236 The licensing
system would "[limit] the suspension of concessions in terms of
quantity, value, and time. '23 7 The government would use a specified
'related right value' of a new . . .sound recording," with the value

228.
Id. 156.
229.
Id.
230.
Id.
231.
It would seem to be in Antigua's best interests to check such violations, as
it seems highly likely that the United States would be quite quick to declare that
Antigua's violations exceeded twenty-one million. See 22.6 Panel Report, supra note 1,
5.12 ("[W]e also note that the United States may have recourse to the appropriate
dispute settlement procedures in the event that it considers that the level of
concessions or other obligations suspended by Antigua exceeds the level of nullification
or impairment we have determined for purposes of the award.").
232.
Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan, Suspending IP Obligations Under TRIPS: A
Viable Alternative to Enforce Prevailing WTO Rulings?, CIEL, Apr. 2008, at 2, available
at http://www.ciel.org/Publications/TRIPS-lP_7MayO8.pdf.
233.
EC-Bananas III Panel Report, supra note 4, 160.
234.
Id.
235.
Id.
236.
Id.
161.
237.
Id.
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calculated by an international institution.2 38
decision further explained,
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The Ecuadorian government would reserve its right to revoke these
licen[s]es at any time. . . . A certain proportion of this value would
represent the performer's share and another, larger part would
represent the producer's share.
If the level of suspension thus
calculated were to risk reaching (together with authorized suspension
in other sectors and/or under other agreements, if any) the level of
nullification and impairment suffered by Ecuador, the authorization
scheme would be stopped. Ecuador believes that the chances that this
239
would happen are very close to nil.

Although Antigua proposed no such structure and merely sought the
right to suspend TRIPS, 240 the specific reference 24 1 to the EC242
Bananas III arbitration by the Anitigua-Gambling arbitrators
hints that the WTO would require a similar system for developing
countries in subsequent arbitration that actually implements the
TRIPS suspension remedy.
Forcing developing countries seeking retaliation under TRIPS to
demonstrate effective monitoring and enforcement of the authorized
IP suspensions could also lead to more effective monitoring and
enforcement of regular TRIPS protections. Weak TRIPS enforcement
in developing countries is primarily attributed to "institutional
weaknesses and the lack of resources," as well as a lack of "the
24 3
political will to curb 'piracy.'
Whereas the incentives to develop systems to enforce TRIPS
protections are currently relatively low, 244 authorization of the TRIPS
suspension remedy increases those incentives. The U.S., or any
similarly situated developed country, would watch for signs that the
retaliating country lost control of the remedy.
The developing
country would have an incentive to avoid expensive and exhausting
disputes over the scope of retaliation and attempts by the developing
economy to maximize the value of suspensions-that is, the

238.
See id. (specifying that the value for European sound recordings would be
calculated "as estimated by the International Federation of the Phonographic Agency
(IFI)").
239.
Id.
240.

Antigua has declined to provide any explanation on how it proposes to
apply such suspension and how it will ensure that the level of the
proposed suspension does not exceed the level to be authorized by the
DSB. We regret that Antigua did not find it useful to provide such
explanations.

22.6 Panel Report, supra note 1, 5.8.
241.
As noted supra in Part III.A, there is little adherence to precedent in WTO
jurisprudence.
242.
22.6 Panel Report, supra note 1, 5.11.
243.
Braga, supranote 190, at 365.
244.
Id. at 367.
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developing
country would develop "the political will to curb
'piracy."' 245 In addition to this newfound will, the developing country
would also correct "institutional weaknesses" by developing effective
246
means of monitoring pirates and protecting information.
Other developed countries, though not directly entangled in the
dispute, would nevertheless have an interest in ensuring that the
suspensions did not affect their protected material. 24 7 Increased
interest in maintaining protection would increase the pressure on the
developing state to increase TRIPS enforcement across the board and
perhaps would lead to assistance in creating enforcement regimes.
248
Such assistance would go far to increase TRIPS compliance.
In the event that developed countries harbor fear that the
monitoring system outlined by Ecuador would never work in practice,
such countries should take heart in the oft-expressed mandate of the
249
WTO to keep remedies strictly equal to the original violation.
Previous decisions on retaliation have emphasized "equivalence" and
"compensation," explicitly repudiating remedies that go outside the
bounds of strict fairness. 250 Not only does this suggest that the
arbitrators knew what they were agreeing to do when they endorsed
Antigua's (and Ecuador's) use of TRIPS suspension, but also it
suggests that developed countries that can demonstrate that
retaliation has spiraled out of control will receive WTO support in
response to demand for stronger levels of monitoring.
The aforementioned existing safeguards within the TRIPS
agreement should also help to hedge against the asymmetry of the
remedy and provide some assurance the WTO is not overtly
encouraging unrestrained piracy.251 Settlement pressure, while still

245.
Id. at 365.
246.
Id. at 365, 367.
247.
The EC-Bananas III arbitrators hint at such an interest when they
emphasize the need for each sanctioned breach of TRIPS to be one in which every right
holder is of the nationality of the affected country (for example, if the suspension
applies to a sound recording of a song, all of the people who have rights in that song
must be from the European Communities for Ecuador to be entitled to suspend TRIPS
protections with regard to that song). See EC-Bananas IIIPanel Report, supra note 4, at
144. While the arbitrators do not explicitly mention third party interest in preserving
rights in the event of an accidental breach, it seems very plausible that, to use the
above example, the United States might show an interest in ensuring the protection of
songs which have mixed nationality of right holders, with some of those right holders
being from the United States and some being from the European Communities.
248.
See Braga, supra note 190, at 365, 367.
249.
See, e.g., STEGER, supra note 106, at 249 ("Suspension of concessions or
retaliation is a blunt and clumsy instrument, but the WTO rule that the suspension
must be 'equivalent' to the level of nullification or impairment prevents it from being
used as a purely punitive device.").
250.
Trachtman, supranote 205, at 138.
251.
See, e.g., Nicholas Wapshott, U.S. May Suffer After WTO Rules Against
Internet Gambling Ban, N.Y. SUN, Dec. 27, 2007, available at http://www.nysun.coml
foreignlus-may-suffer-after-wto-rules-against-internet/68620
("American companies

1028

VANDERBIL TJOURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LA W

[VOL. 42:993

high because of software companies have a great deal to lose should
the safeguards be ignored, 252 may be less skewed as further
applications of the TRIPS safeguards are extrapolated and tested.

V. CONCLUSION

The WTO has taken a significant step toward addressing an
important problem: the impracticality of existing trade retaliation
measures for smaller developing economies against noncompliant
developed economies.
When the WTO decided to extend the
availability of TRIPS suspension as a retaliation option, it gave
developing nations a powerful weapon. The trading system has
reason to be apprehensive about the full implications of possible
retaliation under the untested TRIPS suspension system.
Nevertheless, the decision made in Antigua-Gambling represents a
positive step in the evolution of the international trading system-a
move towards a system that can better accommodate the needs of all
its members.
Ultimately, the availability of TRIPS suspension as a remedy for
developing countries seems to be beneficial to the international
trading system. While the difficulty of calculation and the possibility
of unfair expansion of the retaliatory effects should be considerations
for the WTO as it contemplates the mechanics of the remedy,2 53 the
ultimate effect of having TRIPS suspension on the table is more
consistent with WTO goals than any plausible alternative.
Regardless of the credibility-or lack thereof-of its calculation
of losses, Antigua ultimately offers a persuasive argument that
demonstrates the impossibility of effective punishment using
straightforward suspension in similar sectors. 254 For Antigua and
other developing economies, TRIPS suspension represents a remedy
that carries weight and meaning.
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